Can’t Climb It? Kant! Climate! [/kɑːnt/ /ˈklaɪ.mət/]

How can Kant’s philosophy be used to argue for individual duties to act on climate change?

Do we have a moral duty to protect the climate – and if so, who bears this duty and to what extent? This question is on the minds of many people worldwide in the debate surrounding the consequences and implications of global warming. Alongside legal obligations enshrined in national legal systems – such as those relating to the operation of certain wood-burning installations – there is the question of moral obligations to act, which can be framed and answered in very different ways. If the current global warming is of human origin (anthropogenic) – a theory that can no longer be plausibly disputed on scientific grounds – then, according to the standard model of attributing moral responsibility, it follows that responsibility for the consequences of global warming lies with humankind. Exactly what this means, can mean or should mean is the subject of lively debate in a wide variety of forums – not least within the framework of the legislative process at international level, namely the ‘Conference of the Parties’ (COP) to the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change, with its annual ‘climate summits’ held at various locations. Obligations, whether legal or moral, can be understood as individual or collective; they can be narrow or broad in scope, enforceable by sanctions or merely symbolic – to name but a few variations. In its groundbreaking climate ruling of 24 March 2021, the Federal Constitutional Court, on the basis of Article 20a of the Basic Law (protection of the natural foundations of life), established for the German legal system that we – in essence – as a community have collective legal obligations to pursue climate protection that is appropriate in terms of both timing and quality.

In the project presented here, an argument is put forward not in favour of collective legal obligations, but in favour of individual moral duties to act, based on an approach rooted in Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy. Drawing on Kant, it can be argued that we are obliged to protect the climate, but that we are left to determine, within certain – variable – limits, the means by which we wish to do so. In this context, the idea of Kantian duties of virtue – understood as so-called imperfect duties – is drawn upon to define our climate-related duties. Imperfect duties allow scope (Latin: latitudo) for moral agents. This involves a two-stage model comprising (i) predefined, morally binding and generalisable ends, and (ii) individual freedoms in choosing possible courses of action to achieve those ends. In a famous passage from Kant’s doctrine of virtue, the second part of the Metaphysics of Morals from 1798 (the first part, the Doctrine of Law, dates from 1797), it states: ‘[…] that it [the law] leaves room (latitudo) for free discretion in its observance, that is to say, it cannot specify precisely how and to what extent the action is to contribute to the end, which is at the same time a duty.’ (Immanuel Kant, Academy Edition, AA VI:390). With regard to climate protection, we could spell out this model as follows: First step: the end which is at the same time a duty: to engage in climate protection (living in a climate-friendly manner, striving for climate neutrality in one’s own life). This gives rise to the following maxim as a subjective principle of action: ‘Act in such a way that, in your actions, you fulfil the purpose of climate protection and put the idea of a climate-neutral lifestyle into practice.’ In a second step, individual actions (action tokens) must now be subsumed under this maxim and examined by the moral agent. In doing so, the aforementioned ‘scope (latitudo) for free discretion’ remains. As part of this climate ethics research project, possible objections to the proposed focus on imperfect moral duties are discussed, and a possible refinement of the model is proposed, including the modulation of different requirements for the subsumability of actions under the maxim. A publication is currently in preparation.

The exhibit shows a photograph of the replica of the Kant monument, created in 1864 by Christian Daniel Rauch. Rauch, a pupil of Johann Gottfried Schadow, is regarded as a leading figure of Classicism in the visual arts and of the 19th-century Berlin school of sculpture. The bronze sculpture has a unique and eventful history. Originally erected in Königsberg, Kant’s city (now Kaliningrad), in his honour, it went missing during the Second World War. An attempt to salvage it and a recast are closely linked to the name of the former editor of the weekly newspaper *Die Zeit*, Marion Gräfin Dönhoff. It is well worth reading upon this.

In Kant’s time (1724–1804), there was no talk yet of anthropogenic climate change; his moral philosophy emphasises duties towards others and towards ourselves. According to Kant, animals must not be mistreated either. But what about the climate? From a Kantian perspective, can we also include the climate within the scope of our moral duties? At first glance, this is not obvious, but there are arguments in its favour.

The figure in the picture is trying to get on a level footing with Kant and to make him useful for climate ethics. These efforts are not in vain: we can answer in the affirmative the question of whether we can manage to scale Kant and link Kant and climate. When we say this in English, we ask: “Can’t Climb It?” Phonetically: [/kɑːnt/ /ˈklaɪ.mət/ ?] The homophony [the similarity in sound between the words] becomes clear to us in the English phonetic transcription: Kant! Climate!